Constitutional Law - Mahan v. Howell - Forward or Backward for the One Man-One Vote Rule by Hyland, Clem
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 22 
Issue 4 Summer 1973 Article 11 
Constitutional Law - Mahan v. Howell - Forward or Backward for 
the One Man-One Vote Rule 
Clem Hyland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Clem Hyland, Constitutional Law - Mahan v. Howell - Forward or Backward for the One Man-One Vote Rule 
, 22 DePaul L. Rev. 912 (1973) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol22/iss4/11 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MAHAN v. HOWELL-FORWARD OR
BACKWARD FOR THE ONE MAN-ONE VOTE RULE
The Virginia General Assembly in 1971 enacted statutes reapportion-
ing the state for the election of members of its House of Delegates and
Senate. Two suits were brought challenging the constitutionality of the
House redistricting statutes on the following grounds: population vari-
ances in the districts were impermissible; multimember districts diluted
representation; and the use of multimember districts constituted racial
gerrymandering. The Senate redistricting statute was challenged in a
separate suit alleging that the City of Norfolk was unconstitutionally split
into three districts.' The district court declared the reapportionment
legislation unconstitutionally violative of the one man-one vote principle.
The court created its own electoral districts reducing the allowable
percentage variation from 16 percent under the state plan to approxi-
mately 10 percent. 2 In some instances, however, the court failed to fol-
low city and county political subdivision lines.8
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reapportion-
ment of Virginia's House of Delegates electoral districts complied with the
1. Three three-judge district courts were convened to hear the three suits pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284. These suits were consolidated and heard
by four of the judges who made up the three three-judge panels.
2. There are two basic mathematical tests used to measure deviations from
equality in applying the one man-one vote rule. The first is the population variance
ratio, which is the ratio between the most populous district and the least populous
district. A perfectly districted state would have a population variance of one to
one. The problem with this test is that it only gives a picture of the extremes.
For example, if there are 98 districts each of 50 population, one of 130, and
one of 10, the population variance of 13:1 shows gross inequality, but the
overall disparity is not that bad. The other test measures deviations from the
representative norm. Total population is divided by the total number of legislators
to determine the ideal district. From this figure, one can determine for each
district the percentage deviation from the ideal district. See generally Clem,
Problems Of Measuring And Achieving Equality Of Representation In State Legis-
latures, 42 NEB. L. REv. 622 (1963); Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1226, 1250-51 (1966).
3. Howell v. Mahan, 330 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1971). The district court
based its decision on Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) and Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967), holding that the state had not proved a governmental
necessity for strict adherence to political subdivision lines and thus was unable to
justify the population variances. The district court also established a multimember
district from three single member districts.
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equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, since the state had
a rational objective in preserving the integrity of political subdivision
lines. The Court concluded that more flexibility is permissible in state
legislative reapportionment than in Congressional redistricting. The
interim plan of the district court combining the three single member
districts into one multimember district was also upheld. 4
The decision gives courts greater flexibility in determining the con-
stitutionality of a state apportionment plan rather than confining them to the
old standard of strict mathematical equality required by the Warren
Court. What follows is an analysis of Mahan v. Howell in light of
relevant case law, evaluating the guidelines it establishes and how it
represents a departure from a rigid and narrow interpretation of the one
man-one vote principle.
Prior to 1962, the Supreme Court consistently refused to entertain
constitutional complaints about legislative malapportionment. Colegrove
v. Green5 was long regarded as decisive precedent in litigation concerning
districting practices and proved an effective barrier to reapportionment
suits. Colegrove originated from a citizen voter complaint challenging
the failure of the Illinois legislature to realign congressional districts to
conform with population shifts over a number of years. The complaint
contested the disparity of population among districts which allegedly
operated to limit the effectiveness of individual votes. The Court dis-
missed the complaint as non-justiciable because the question was pecul-
iarly political in nature. 6 Though many authors disagreed as to the
proper interpretation of Colegrove, the case served as precedent for the
dismissal of suits attacking the districting of state legislatures and Con-
gress. 7
4. Mahan v. Howell, 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
5. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
6. Id. at 552. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for only three of the justices in
dismissing for want of justiciability. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result,
dismissing for want of equity, holding that Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932),
had established malapportionment as a justiciable issue. For a discussion of
Colegrove see Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39
(1962).
7. In a series of per curiam decisions, the Court refused to render a judicial
remedy for malapportionment. See Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v.
McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v.
Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950). In Mac-
Dougal v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1941), overruled by Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
814 (1969), the Court dismissed the complaint on the merits rather than for a
lack of justiciability. For a discussion of pre-Baker cases see Lewis, Legislative
Apportionment And The Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. Rnv. 1057 (1958); Caruso,
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In 1962, however, apparently because of the number of malapportioned
state legislatures,8 the Supreme Court decided in Baker v. Carr9 that
the issue of state apportionment was within its jurisdiction. 10  The
Baker plaintiffs challenged Tennessee's legislative apportionment arguing
that inequality (population variances) in voting districts resulted in a
denial of plaintiff's rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court found claims of population inequality among electoral districts
justiciable and within the jurisdiction of the Court, but failed to establish
a standard to determine the constitutionality of population variances
among districts in state legislative apportionment plans."
Having resolved the issue of justiciability, the Court began developing
a standard to be applied in reapportionment cases. Although Gray v.
Sanders12 was not concerned with legislative or congressional apportion-
ment, the Court, in striking down the Georgia unit system used in state-
wide primaries, established the basic principle of equality among voters
within a state: a "conception of political equality . . . can mean only
The Rocky Road From Colegrove To Wesberry: Or, You Can't Get There From
Here, 36 TENN. L. REV. 621 (1969).
8. In 1962, there were great disparities among legislative districts which pro-
duced unequal legislative voting strength in almost all states. For example, 8 per
cent of the population could control the Nevada Senate, while only 11.6 per cent
could control Vermont's House of Representatives. In Connecticut 33.4 per cent
of the population was sufficient to control the Senate, while only 12 per cent
could rule the House. See Goldberg, The Statistics Of Malapportionment, 72 YALE
L.J. 90 (1962).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Many people forsaw the decision in light of the
Court's action in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Though that case
was decided on the basis of the fifteenth amendment, one author saw Gomillion
as an indication of a possible change in the Court's attitude toward the justiciability
of apportionment cases. See Lucas, Dragon In The Thicket: A Perusal of Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, 1961 SUPREME COURT REV. 194.
10. 369 U.S. at 209. In Baker, the Court pointed out that a majority of the
Justices in Colegrove actually sustained the justiciability of the question presented
and that the complaint was dismissed for want of equity, not justiciability.
11. For a general discussion of Baker v. Carr see McCloskey, Foreword: The
Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1962); McKay, Political Thickets
And Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment And Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REV. 645
(1963); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics In Search Of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT
REV. 252; Lancaster, What's Wrong With Baker v. Carr?, 15 VAND. L. REV. 1247
(1962).
12. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Every qualified voter was entitled to one vote, but
in tallying the votes the use of the county unit system gave rural votes more weight
than urban votes. Population variance ratio between the largest and smallest
districts was 99:1. See generally Bondurant, A Stream Polluted at its Source: The
Georgia County Unit System, 12 J. PUB. L. 86 (1963); Note, Constitutional Law-
County Unit System Per Se Unconstitutional-Fourteenth Amendment Requires Pre-
cise Equality In Statewide Election, 26 GA. B. J. 339 (1964).
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one thing-one person, one vote."' 3  During the same term, the Court
in Wesberry v. Sanders' 4 stated that one man's vote in a congressional
election must equal as nearly as is practicable the vote of another. 15
The Court avoided the equal protection clause and based its decision on
article I section 2 of the Constitution, possibly to leave the field open for
application of some other standard to state legislative apportionment.'"
In Reynolds v. Sims,' 7 the Court applied the standard formulated in
Gray and Wesberry, modifying it to require state legislative bodies to
apportion their districts as nearly as is practicable on an equal population
basis. The plaintiffs, qualified voters of Jefferson County, Alabama,
had challenged the apportionment laws of that state on the issue of
whether there are any constitutional principles which would allow a
departure from the basic standard of equality among voters in the ap-
portioning of seats of state legislatures. 18 The Court stated:
By holding that as a federal constitutional requisite both houses of a state legislature
must be apportioned on a population basis, we mean that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in
both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable ....
Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional require-
ment.1 9
Chief Justice Warren explained that more flexibility may be permissible
in state legislative apportionment than in congressional districting. A
state may maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions and
13. 372 U.S. at 381.
14. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
15. Id. at 7-8.
16. For a general discussion of Wesberry see Carpenter, Wesberry v. Sanders:
A Case Of Oversimplification, 9 VILL. L. REV. 415 (1964); Weiss, An Analysis Of
Wesberry v. Sanders, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 67 (1965).
17. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Following its decision in Reynolds, the Court over-
turned the apportionment plans of five other states: Colorado: Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Delaware: Roman v.
Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Virginia: Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964);
Maryland: Maryland Comm. For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656
(1964); New York: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 (1964). On June
22, 1964 the Supreme Court handed down a number of memorandum decisions
concerning state legislative apportionment plans based on its ruling in Reynolds;
Iowa: Hill v. Davis, 378 U.S. 565 (1964); Connecticut: Pinney v. Butterworth,
378 U.S. 564 (1964); Idaho: Hearne v. Smylie, 378 U.S. 563 (1964); Michigan:
Marshall v. Hare, 378 U.S. 561 (1964); Illinois: Germano v. Kerner, 378 U.S.
560 (1964); Oklahoma: Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964); Ohio: Nolan v.
Rhodes, 378 U.S. 556 (1964); Washington: Meyers v. Thigpen, 378 U.S. 554
(1964); Florida: Swann v. Adams, 378 U.S. 553 (1964).
18. 377 U.S. at 561.
19. Id. at 577.
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provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a state
legislative apportionment plan, but one vote must equal another. The
Court would permit a divergence from a strict population standard when
based on "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of rational
state policy" 20 such as insuring some voice to political subdivisions as
political subdivisions. The Court must also consider the character as well
as the degree of deviation from a strict population basis.
The companion cases decided with Reynolds did little to clarify the
standards set forth in that case.21 Roman v. Sincock22 held that it was not
practicable to establish strict mathematical standards for determining the
constitutionality of a state legislative apportionment plan under the equal
protection clause. Chief Justice Warren suggested that the proper ap-
proach for the Court was to examine the particular circumstances in each
case to determine whether or not the state had adhered faithfully to a
plan of population-based representation.
The 1964 apportionment cases left many questions unanswered. The
Court did not clearly establish the constitutionality of multimember dis-
tricts and failed to determine whether the principles set forth in these
cases should be applied to local governments. The Court also failed to
answer the question of what constituted substantial equality among dis-
tricts and how much population deviation would be allowed. 23
These decisions stirred up a storm of criticism in Congress with many
members contending that, within reasonable limits, states had the right
20. Id. at 579. The Court further stated that "the overriding objective
must be substantial equality of population among the various districts." Id. For a
discussion of reasons which would be insufficient to justify a divergence see Auer-
bach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One Vote, One Value,
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 1.
21. In Maryland Comm. For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 675(1964), the Court found that "considerations of history and tradition, relied upon
by appellees, do not, and could not, provide a sufficient justification for the sub-
stantial deviations from population-based representation in both houses of the
Maryland Legislature." In Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 692 (1964), the Court
held: "The fact that the maximum variances in the populations of various state
legislative districts are less than the extreme deviations from a population basis in
the composition of the Federal Electoral College fails to provide a constitutionally
cognizable basis for sustaining a state apportionment scheme under the Equal
Protection Clause." The Lucas case may be the most interesting of all because the
Court rejected a state apportionment plan that had been approved by the voters.
22. 377 U.S. 695 (1964).
23. For a general discussion of Reynolds and its companion cases see Baldwin
and Laughlin, The Reapportionment Cases: A Study In The Constitutional Ad-judication Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 301 (1964); Carroll, The Legislative Ap-
portionment Case, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1964); Swindler, Reapportionment:
Revisionism Or Revolution?, 43 N.C.L. REv. 55 (1964).
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to apportion their legislatures as they wished. Opponents of the decisions
proposed various constitutional amendments, attempting to curb the effect
of Reynolds and its companion cases, but none of the amendments passed
both the House and the Senate. 2
4
In 1965, the Court considered the first question left open by Reynolds,
that of multimember districting. In Fortson v. Dorsey,25 the Court held
that equal protection does not necessarily require that state legislatures
must be composed of single member districts. However, at the same
time, the Court did not hold multimember districts per se constitutional.2 6
This concept was again advanced in Burns v. Richardson27 where multi-
member districts were found permissible, subject to constitutional chal-
lenges when such districts were designed to or would minimize the voting
strength of various elements of the voting population. 28 The Court im-
plied that multimember districts would be valid in some instances, but
left the door open to further litigation on that issue.
Beginning in 1967, the Supreme Court began to significantly tighten
the substantial equality of population requirement established by Reynolds.
The Court in Swann v. Adams29 invalidated a Florida legislative reap-
portionment plan because the state failed to present acceptable reasons
for variations of population among legislative districts. The decision
stated that de minimis deviations are unavoidable but variations of 30
per cent and 40 per cent can hardly be considered de minimis. 30  Swann
24. See R. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF EQUAL
REPRESENTATION 203-13 (1970); McKay, Court, Congress, and Reapportionment,
63 MICH. L. REV. 255 (1964); Note, The Equal-Population Standard: A New
Concept of Equal Protection In State Apportionment Cases, 33 U. CIN. L. REV.
483, 502-03 (1964).
25. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). The Fortson plaintiffs argued that county wide
voting requirements in seven multi-district counties violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. For general discussion of Fortson see Note,
Representative Government-Use of County-Wide Voting To Elect State Senators
Does Not Deprive Voters of Multi-District Counties of Equal Protection of the
Laws (United States), 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 596, 599.
26. For a general discussion of multimember districts see Banzhaf, Multi-Member
Electoral Districts-Do They Violate The "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE
L. J. 1309 (1966); Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts
And Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666 (1972).
27. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
28. Id. at 89.
29. 385 U.S. 440 (1967). The variances in this contested plan ranged from
18.28 per cent over-representation to 15.27 per cent under-representation in the
House to 15.09 per cent over-representation and 10.56 per cent under-representation
in the Senate.
30. Id. at 444.
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indicated that population deviations could be justified by two considera-
tions: de minimis deviations or the effectuation of an acceptable state
policy."' On the same day as the Swann decision, the Court handed down
two per curiam decisions, Duddleston v. Grills32 and Kirkpatrick v.
Preisler.3 3  In Grills, the Court vacated a district court's holding that a
1965 Indiana reapportionment act was constitutional. The population
variances under this plan ranged from an over-representation of 7.2
per cent to an under-representation of 12.8 per cent from an ideal plan.8 4
In Preisler, the 1965 Missouri Constitutional Redistricting Act was held
unconstitutional because it provided for a 9.9 per cent maximum devia-
tion.35 Late in 1967, the Court invalidated a Texas reapportionment plan
that allowed a variance ranging from approximately an over-representation
of 15 per cent to an under-representation of 11 per cent. The Court felt
that the announced policy of the State of Texas, to respect county lines,
did not necessitate this range of deviation.3 6  These decisions placed a
burden on the state to show acceptable reasons for population variances.
Precise mathematical equality was not required, nor was the exact amount
of permissible deviation determined.
In one of the most important decisions since Reynolds, the Court
significantly extended the one man-one vote principle in A very v. Midland
County3 7 holding that units of local government with general powers over
a particular area must be apportioned on the basis of population equality.
The petitioner alleged that the four districts represented in the Midland
County Commissioners were grossly disproportionate in population dis-
tribution.38 This decision further established the population standard as
31. Note, Constitutional Law-Congressional Districting-"One Man-One Vote"
Demands Near Mathematical Precision, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 152, 159 (1969).
32. 385 U.S. 455 (1967).
33. 385 U.S. 450 (1967).
34. Grills v. Branigin, 255 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D. Ind. 1966).
35. Preisler v. Missouri, 257 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Mo. 1966).
36. Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967).
37. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). For a general discussion of the apportionment issue
in local governments see Martin, Local Reapportionment, 47 J. URBAN L. 345 (1969);
Martin, The Constitutional Status Of Local Government Reapportionment, 6 VAL.
U.L. REV. 237 (1972). For a discussion of Avery see Comment, Avery v.
Midland County: Reapportionment And Local Government Revisited, 3 GA.
L. REV. 110 (1968).
38. According to the 1968 estimates, one district had a population of 67,906
while "[tjhe others, all rural areas, had populations, respectively, of about 852;
414; 828." 390 U.S. at 474. The Midland County Commissioners consisted of five
members including a county judge, elected at large from the county and four com-
missioners, one elected from each district.
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the dominant consideration in apportionment by holding that the Con-
stitution does not permit a "substantial variation from equal population
in drawing districts for units of local government having general govern-
mental powers over the entire geographic area served by the body.139 As
in Reynolds and Wesberry the Court did not require precise mathematical
equality, but stated only that the equal protection clause may allow the
state to sometimes distinguish between citizens as long as these distinctions
are never arbitrary or invidious. 40 As in all previous decisions the Court
failed to determine how much deviation would be allowed and thus set
the stage for still further litigation.
In two 1969 decisions the Court continued its move toward an absolute
population equality standard. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler4 1 struck down
Missouri's congressional districting plan which resulted in the most
populous district being 3.13 per cent above the mathematical ideal and
the least populous being 2.84 per cent below, for a maximum variance of
only 5.97 per cent. The Court rejected Missouri's contention that these
variations were acceptable because they were de minimis, holding that
there were no fixed percentage population variances small enough to be
considered de minimis. 42  The majority opinion emphasized that
the 'as nearly as practicable' standard requires that the State make a good-faith
effort to achieve precise mathematical equality . . . . Unless population variances
39. 390 U.S. at 485. Previousy in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967), the
Court refused to extend the one man-one vote principle to city and legislative bodies
because no invidious discrimination was shown. In Sailors v. Board of Education,
387 U.S. 105 (1967), the Court held that the equal population principle was in-
applicable to a board of education because the board fulfilled non-legal functions
and positions were appointive, not elective. The Court distinguished these cases
from Avery, holding that the Commissioners Court in Avery had broad policy
making power that affected many people. The equal protection clause reaches the
exercise of state power, whether directly or through subdivisions of the state or local
governments.
40. 390 U.S. at 484. In Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970),
the Court further extended the one man-one vote principle to the election of junior
college district trustees. For a discussion of Hadley see Note, Uncertain Voice In
The Representation Thicket: Hadley v. Junior College District, 39 U.M.K.C. L. REV.
78 (1970).
41. 394 U.S. 526 (1969).
42. Id. at 530. The Court rejected Missouri's other arguments "that variances
were necessary to avoid fragmenting areas with distinct economic and social in-
terests and thereby diluting the effective representation of those interests in Con-
gress," and ". . . that variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State's
attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district
lines along existing county, municipal, or other political subdivision boundaries."
394 U.S. at 533-34. The Court also felt that the state had failed "to ascertain the
number of eligible voters in each district and to apportion accordingly." 394 U.S.
at 534-35.
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among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the
State must justify each variance, no matter how small.43
The decision follows the implication developed in Swann that a burden of
proof is placed on the state to justify any variations among populations of
various districts. In Kirkpatrick, the Court felt that Missouri had not made
a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality, because a
more equal apportionment plan was available and thus variances were
not unavoidable. 44
In the companion case of Wells v. Rockefeller,45 the Court invalidated
New York's congressional districting statute which provided that the
smallest district would be 6.6 per cent below the mean population while
the most populous district would be 6.5 per cent above the mean. The
Court rejected the state's justification for accepting the population variances
-- creating districts with specific interest orientations-and based its
decision on its holding in Kirkpatrick.46
The decision in Kirkpatrick and Wells implied that it would be very
difficult for a state to justify deviations from exact numerical equality
among its various districts. These cases indicated that the Court would
require precise mathematical equality in population and that justification
for population variances such as the preservation of political subdivisions
and other non-population factors would be insufficient. It must be
remembered that these cases concerned congressional redistricting statutes.
The effect of a strict equality standard on a state legislative apportionment
plan in light of the equal protection test proposed by Reynolds remained
unclear at this point.47
In Whitcomb v. Chavis48 the Court again turned its attention to the
issue of multimember districting. In Chavis the petitioner challenged state
statutes establishing Marion County as a multimember district for the
election of state senators and representatives. Plaintiffs argued that the
multimember districts discriminated against them. The district court
43. 394 U.S. at 530-31 (emphasis added). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 577 (1964).
44. 394 U.S. at 531.
45. 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
46. Id. at 546. The Court emphasized its findings in Kirkpatrick that population
variances must be unavoidable or shown to be justifiable.
47. One author suggested that: "The new standard appears to be a simple
arithmetic approach based solely on gross population which assumes that 'equal
numbers' means 'equal representation.'" See Note, Congressional Redistricting:
Missouri Again Fails To Meet Constitutional Requirements, 35 Mo. L. REV. 246, 251
(1970).
48. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
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agreed and held this scheme unconstitutional because of the minimization
of black voting power. 49 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that multi-
member districts are not inherently violative of the fourteenth amendment,
but suggesting a preference for single member districts.50
Late in 1971, the Court indicated for the first time a possible loosening
of a strict application of the one man-one vote principle in apportionment
cases. In Abate v. Mundt"1 the Court sustained a reapportionment plan
for the Rockland County New York Board of Supervisors, even though
this plan produced a total deviation of 11.9 per cent from population
equality. The majority view stated that "the particular circumstances and
needs of a local community as a whole may sometimes justify departures
from strict equality. '' 52 Again the Court emphasized that the state must
justify population variances. In this particular case, the justification was
Rockland County's long history of and need for close cooperation between
the county and its constituent towns.
From 1962 to 1971 the Supreme Court opened up the area of reap-
portionment to litigation, but left many questions unanswered. In two
short years, the Court established reapportionment as a justiciable issue
in Baker, the one man-one vote principle in Gray, and the nearly equal
as practicable standard for congressional districting in Wesberry. The
1964 reapportionment cases of Reynolds and its companion cases applied
the standards adopted in Gray and Wesberry to the apportionment of state
legislatures. Fortson, Burns and Chavis did little to clarify the problems
involved in multimember districting, while Avery extended the one man-
one vote principle to local governments. The Court applied a strict
mathematical equality test in a congressional context in Kirkpatrick and
Wells, yet Abate suggested a deviation in the future from a narrow interpre-
49. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
50. 403 U.S. at 159-60. The Court also felt that "affirmance of the District
Court would spawn endless litigation concerning the multimember district systems
now widely employed in this country." Id. at 157. For a general discussion of
Chavis see Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering, And
Black Voting Rights, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 521 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-
Multimember Districting As A Violation Of Equal Protection, 1970 WIs. L. REV.
552.
51. 403 U.S. 182 (1971). Rockland County was governed by a board of
supervisors consisting of supervisors of the county's five towns. The members of
the county legislature held their county offices by virtue of their election as town
supervisors, which produced close co-operation between the towns and the county.
Increased population caused severe malapportionment and the 1969 plan provided
for a county legislature composed of eighteen members chosen from five legislative
districts. These districts corresponded to the five towns.
52. 403 U.S. at 185.
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tion of the one man-one vote principle. On the basis of these develop-
ments the next logical question would be whether to apply the absolute
mathematical equality test of Kirkpatrick and Wells or the general equal
protection test suggested by Reynolds in determining the constitutionality
of population variances in state legislative reapportionment. In Mahan v.
Howell,5 3 the Court adopted the latter approach and decided that states can
deviate from nearly absolute mathematical equality in apportioning their
own legislatures.
The Howell petitioners challenged a state reapportionment act that
produced an over-representation of 6.8 per cent in one district and 9.6
per cent under-representation in another district for a maximum deviation
of 16.4 per cent.5 4  Whether or not the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment permits only unavoidable population variances in
state legislative apportionment, despite a good faith effort to achieve ab-
solute equality, was the issue in this action. 55  Virginia attempted to
justify its plan in this case on the grounds of maintaining political sub-
division lines.56 It wanted districts to conform to local boundaries
in order to allow subdivisions a unified voice in the lower house. The
district court held that since the state had not proved a governmental
necessity for strictly adhering to political subdivision lines, the plan was
constitutionally invalid. 57 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
proper equal protection test is based on a state's rational considerations,
not a showing of necessity. 58
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, found that the state
policy of preserving political subdivisions urged by Virginia to justify the
divergences was furthered by the plan adopted by the legislature, allow-
53. 93 S. Ct. 979 (1973).
54. The deviations in the Virginia plan were not as large as some previously
struck down by the Court in Reynolds, Swann, and Kilgarlin but larger than others in
Kirkpatrick and Wells. Appellee DuVal argued that another method of computation
would result in a deviation of 23.6 per cent.
55. 93 S. Ct. at 983. The Court had reserved decision on this issue in Connor v.
Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972).
56. The issue of a state's policy of maintaining the integrity of political sub-
division lines was presented in Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 686 (1964) where the
Court noted: "Because cities and counties have consistently not been split or di-
vided for purposes of legislative representation, multimember districts have been
utilized for cities and counties whose population entitle them to more than a single
representative. . . . And, because of a tradition of respecting the integrity of the
boundaries of cities and counties in drawing district lines, districts have been con-
structed only of combinations of counties and cities and not by pieces of them."
57. 330 F. Supp. at 1140.
58. 93 S. Ct. at 986.
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ing the 16.4 per cent population variance, and that it was a rational
one. The next question was whether the divergences were tolerable.
Again, the Court emphasized that there is no previously established range
of percentage deviations that is permissible, but the divergences in these
circumstances were tolerable. The Court implied that this allowable
range may be tightened in other circumstances and strengthened this im-
plication by failing to establish a definite percentage of deviation that
would be considered allowable. 59
The district court also created a multimember senatorial district made
up of three single member districts in order to correct population variances
due to 36,700 naval personnel being stationed at the U.S. naval station
in Norfolk. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's action to the
extent that it was proper under the circumstances-the imminency of the
1971 fall elections.60 Again the Court failed to fully discuss the issue of
multimember districting and apparently has left this area open to further
litigation.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurred with the majority regarding the multi-
member districting issue, but agreed with the district court in rejecting
the state's justification for the population variances. He framed the equal
protection test in terms of governmental necessity, rather than relying on
the rational basis test. His opinion acknowledged that legislative ap-
portionment may be allowed to have small variances in some instances,
but proposed the same constitutional standard for state legislative reap-
portionment and congressional districting.61 He noted that the district
court's plan would achieve a higher degree of equality in district popula-
tion and thus was more feasible. This analysis coincided with that of
the second Kirkpatrick case where a plan was struck down due to the
existence of another more equal plan.62
Some people may interpret the Mahan decision as a threat to the one
man-one vote principle established by the Warren Court. It does indicate
59. Id. at 987. The Court previously noted in Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
445 (1967) that "the fact that a 10% or a 15% variation from the norm as ap-
proved in one State has little bearing on the validity of a similar variation in another
State."
60. Id. at 989. The Court relied on its rule handed down in Chavis that
multimember districts were not per se violative of the equal protection clause.
61. Id. at 993. Mr. Justice Brennan further stated that: "While the State may
have a broader range of interests to which it can point in attempting to justify a
failure to achieve precise equality in the context of legislative apportionment, it by
no means follows that the State is subject to a lighter burden of proof or that the
controlling constitutional standard is in any sense distinguishable." Id.
62. Id. at 997. Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinions in
Kirkpatrick and Wells.
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a departure from a single standard of mathematical equality, at least in
state legislative reapportioning. The Court noted that "latitude afforded
to States in legislative redistricting is somewhat broader than that afforded
to them in congressional redistricting." 63  The Court itself described the
test of Kirkpatrick and Wells as one of absolute equality and that the
application of this strict test to state legislative redistricting may impair
the normal functioning of state and local governments.6 4
Mahan v. Howell does not overturn the one man-one vote principle,
but simply allows the Court more flexibility in looking at factors other
than population in determining the constitutionality of an apportionment
plan. As in other reapportionment decisions, the Court looked at the
particular facts in this case and refused to establish a single standard to
be applied uniformly in all cases dealing with reapportionment.
The Court seemed to understand and reach a very important issue in
this case-whether or not equal population necessarily means equal rep-
resentation. During the 1960's, the Court became preoccupied with
mathematical standards and failed to look beyond population statistics to
determine whether there was actual inequality among voting districts.
The Court did not realize that there was more to fair representation than
eliminating malapportioned legislatures under an equal population basis.
Basic local governmental units such as cities and counties perform im-
portant functions for the state and therefore it is reasonable to maintain
the integrity of these units in formulating legislative districts. The preserva-
tion of these political subdivisions appears rational when one remembers
that these city and county units have similar interests and needs that must
be represented in the state legislature. It becomes a test of balancing
interests between the rights of an individual to have his vote count as
much as that of another and the obligation of the state to be receptive to
the needs and interests of local governmental bodies.
Another interesting aspect of the case is the apparent reliance of the
Court on the "old" equal protection test. The Court referred to the
proper test in this case as one based on a state's rational considerations
(rational basis test), rather than one of governmental necessity (com-
pelling state interest). Application of this test reduces the burden on
the state in justifying population variances among various districts. 65
63. Id. at 986.
64. Id. at 985.
65. Some authors feel that the Court is going to apply the old equal protection
test in all circumstances in the future. For a general discussion of equal protection
see Developments In The Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARM. L. REv. 1065 (1969);
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The case does not answer all the questions presented in reapportion-
ment cases, but it does give the Court needed flexibility. The question
remains as to how much deviation will be permitted in future cases. Will
the Court redefine the test established by Kirkpatrick and Wells to allow
flexibility in congressional districting plans? Will the Court consider
reasons other than the preservation of political subdivisions as a basis for
a state's reapportionment plan to deviate from mathematical equality?
Will the Court look beyond the mathematics of the situation and see
whether gerrymandering has taken place among the districts?66
The Warren Court of the 1960's saved many states from malapportion-
ment, but it will be the task of the Burger Court in the 1970's to clarify
the uncertainties in reapportionment litigation. This Court has taken
the important first step---a re-evaluation of whether equal population
means equal representation.
Clem Hyland
Note, The Decline And Fall of The New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach,
58 VA. L. REV. 1489 (1972).
66. Gerrymandering is the practice of districting along unnatural lines to
achieve partisan advantage or some other unfair objective. It is actually a
manipulation of boundary lines among districts of equal population. See generally
Edwards, The Gerrymander And 'One Man, One Vote,' 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 879
(1971); Gottlieb, Identifying Gerrymanders, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 540 (1971).
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